Introduction
In the context of games of incomplete information, the term "cheap talk" refers to direct and costless communication among players. Cheap-talk models should be contrasted with more standard signalling models. In the latter, informed agents communicate private information indirectly via their choices-concerning, say, levels of education attained-and these choices are costly. Indeed, signalling is credible precisely because choices are di¤erentially costly-for instance, high productivity workers may distinguish themselves from low productivity workers by acquiring levels of education that would be too costly for the latter.
The central question addressed in cheap-talk models is the following: How much information, if any, can be credibly transmitted when communication is direct and costless? Interest in this question stems from the fact that with cheap talk, there is always a "babbling" equilibrium in which the participants deem all communication to be meaningless-after all it has no direct payo¤ consequences-and as a result, no one has any incentive to communicate anything meaningful. It is then natural to ask if there are also equilibria in which communication is meaningful and informative.
We begin by examining the question posed above in the simplest possible setting: there is a single informed party-an expert-who o¤ers information to a single uninformed decision maker. This simple model forms the basis of much work on cheap talk and was introduced in a now classic paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982) . In what follows, we …rst outline the main …nding of this paper-while there are informative equilibria, these entail a signi…cant loss of information. We then examine various remedies that have been proposed to solve (or at least alleviate) the "information problem."
The Information Problem
We begin by considering the leading case in the model of Crawford and Sobel, henceforth CS. A decision maker must choose some decision y: Her payo¤ depends on y and on an unknown state of the world ; which is distributed uniformly on the unit interval. The decision maker can base her decision on the costless message m sent by an expert who knows the precise value of : The decision maker's payo¤ is U (y; ) = (y ) 2 ; and the expert's payo¤ is V (y; ; b) = (y ( + b)) 2 ; where b 0 is a "bias"parameter that measures how closely aligned the preferences of the two are. Because of the tractability of the "uniform-quadratic" speci…cation, this paper, and indeed much of the cheap talk literature, restricts attention to this case.
The sequence of play is as follows:
Expert learns
Expert sends message m
Decision maker chooses y
What can be said about (Bayesian-perfect) equilibria of this game? As noted above, there is always an equilibrium in which no information is conveyed-even in the case where preferences are perfectly aligned (i.e. b = 0). In such a "babbling" equilibrium, the decision maker believes (correctly it turns out) that there is no information content in the expert's message and hence chooses her decision only on the basis of her prior information. Given this, the expert has no incentive to be convey any information-he may as well send random, uninformative messages-and hence the expert indeed "babbles."This reasoning is independent of any of the details of the model other than the fact that the expert's message is "cheap talk."
Are there equilibria in which all information is conveyed? When there is any misalignment of preferences, the answer turns out to be no. Speci…cally, Proposition 1 If the expert is even slightly biased, all equilibria entail some information loss.
The proposition follows from the fact that if the expert's message always revealed the true state and the decision maker believed him, then the expert would have the incentive to exaggerate the state-in some states , he would report + b:
Are there equilibria in which some but not all information is shared? Suppose that following message m, the decision maker holds posterior beliefs given by distribution function G: The action y is chosen to maximize her payo¤s given G. Because payo¤s are quadratic, this amounts to choosing a y satisfying:
Suppose that the expert faces a choice between sending a message m that induces action y or an alternative message, m 0 ; that induces an action y 0 > y: Suppose further that in state 0 the expert prefers y 0 to y and vice-versa in state < 0 : Since the preferences satisfy the single-crossing condition, V y > 0; the expert would prefer y 0 to y in all states higher than 0 : This implies that there is a unique state a, satisfying < a < 0 ; in which the expert is indi¤erent between the two actions. Equivalently, the distance between y and the expert's "bliss" (ideal) action in state a is equal to the distance between action y 0 and the expert's bliss action in state a: Hence,
Thus, message m is sent for all states < a and message m 0 for all states > a:
To comprise an equilibrium where exactly two actions are induced, one would need to …nd values for a; y; and y 0 that simultaneously satisfy equations (1) and (2) . Since m is sent in all states < a, from equation (1) ; y = a 2 : Similarly, y 0 = 1+a 2 : Inserting these expressions into equation (2) yields
Equation (3) has several interesting properties. First, notice that a is uniquely determined for a given bias. Second, notice that when the bias gets large b > 1 4 ; there is no feasible value of a; so no information is conveyed in any equilibrium. Finally, notice that when the expert is unbiased (b = 0) ; there exists an equilibrium where the state space is equally divided into "high"( > 1 2 ) and "low" < 1 2 regions and the optimal actions respond accordingly. As the bias increases, the low region shrinks in size while the high region grows; thus, less information is conveyed the higher is the bias.
For all b < 1 4 ; we constructed an equilibrium that partitions the state space into two intervals. As the bias decreases, equilibria exist that partition the state space into more than two intervals. Indeed, Crawford and Sobel (1982) showed that:
Proposition 2 All equilibria partition the state space into a …nite number of intervals. The information conveyed in the most informative equilibrium is decreasing in the bias of the expert.
If the expert were able to commit to fully reveal what he knows, both parties would be better o¤ than in any equilibrium of the game described above. With full revelation, the decision maker would choose y = and earn a payo¤ of 0 while the expert would earn a payo¤ of b 2 : It is easily veri…ed that in any equilibrium the payo¤s of both parties are lower than this. The overall message of the CS model is that, absent any commitment possibilities, cheap talk inevitably leads to information loss, which is increasing in the bias of the expert. The remainder of the paper studies various "remedies"for the information loss problem: more extensive communication, delegation, contracts, and multiple experts.
Remedies

Extensive communication
In the CS model, the form of the communication between the two parties was onesided-the expert simply o¤ered a report to the decision maker who then acted on this. Of course, communication can be much richer than this, and it is natural to ask if its form a¤ects information transmission. One might think that it would not. First, one-sided communication where the expert speaks two or more times is no better than having him speak once since any information the expert might convey in many messages can be encoded in a single message. Now, suppose the communication is two-sided-it is a conversation-so the decision maker also speaks. Since she has no information of her own to contribute, all she can do is to send random messages and at …rst glance, this seems to add little. As we will show, however, random messages improve information transmission by acting as coordinating devices.
To see this, suppose the expert has bias b = 1 12 : As we previously showed, when only he speaks, the best equilibrium is where the expert reveals whether the state is above or below 1 3 : Suppose instead that we allow for face-to-face conversation-a simultaneous exchange of messages-and that the sequence of play is:
Expert learns
Expert and DM meet "face-to-face" Expert sends "written report"
Decision maker chooses y
The following strategies constitute an equilibrium: The expert reveals some information at the face-to-face meeting, but there is also some randomness in what transpires. Depending on how the conversation goes, the meeting is deemed by both parties to be a "success" or a "failure." After the meeting, and depending on its outcome, the expert may send an additional "written report"to the decision maker.
During the meeting, the expert reveals whether is above or below 1 6 ; he also sends some additional messages that a¤ect the success or failure of the meeting. If he reveals that 1 6 ; the meeting is adjourned, no more communication takes place, and the decision maker chooses a low action y L = 1 12 that is optimal given the information that 1 6 : If, however, he reveals that > 1 6 ; then the written report depends on whether the meeting was a success or a failure. If the meeting is a failure, no more communication takes place, and the decision maker chooses the "pooling" action y P = 7 12 that is optimal given that > is taken. The actions taken in di¤erent states are depicted in Figure 1 . The dotted line depicts the actions, + 1 12 , that are "ideal"for the expert. Notice that in state 1 6 ; the expert prefers y L to y P (y L is closer to the dotted line than is y P ) and prefers y M to y L . Thus if there were no uncertainty about the outcome of the meeting-for instance, if all meetings were "successes," then the expert would not be willing to reveal whether the state is above or below 1 6 ; for states = 1 6 ", the expert would say 2 1 6 ; 5 12 ; thereby inducing y M instead of y L . If all meetings were failures, then for states = 1 6 + ", the expert would say < 1 6 , thereby There exists a probability p = 16 21 such that when = 1 6 the expert is indi¤erent between y L and a (p; 1 p) lottery between y M and y P (whose certainty equivalent is labelled y C in the …gure). Also, when < 1 6 , the expert prefers y L to a (p; 1 p) lottery between y M and y P ; and when > 1 6 , the expert prefers a (p; 1 p) lottery between y M and y P to y L .
It remains to specify a conversation such that the meeting is successful with probability p = 16 21 : Suppose the expert sends a message (Low; A i ) or (High; A i ) and the decision maker sends a message A j ; where i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; 21g : These messages are interpreted as follows: Low signals that 1 6 and High signals that > 1 6 : The A i and A j messages play the role of a coordinating device and determine whether the meeting is successful. The expert chooses A i at random and each A i is equally likely. Similarly, the decision maker chooses A j at random. Given these choices, the meeting is a Success if 0 i j < 16 or j i > 5 F ailure otherwise For example, if the messages of the expert and the decision maker are (High; A 17 ) and A 5 ; respectively, then it is inferred that > 1 6 and since i j = 12 < 16; the meeting is a success. Observe that with these strategies, given any A i or A j , the probability that the meeting is a success is exactly 16 21 : The equilibrium constructed above conveys more information than any equilibria of the CS game. The remarkable fact about the equilibrium is that this improvement in information transmission is achieved by adding a stage in which the uninformed decision maker also participates. While the analysis above concerns itself with the case where b = 1 12 ; informational improvement through via a "conversation" is a general phenomenon ( 
Delegation
A key tenet of organizational theory is the "delegation principle"which says that the power to make decisions should reside in the hands of those with the relevant information (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992 ). Thus, one approach to solving the information problem is simply to delegate the decision to the expert. However, the expert's bias will distort the chosen action from the decision maker's perspective. Delegation this leads to a trade-o¤ between an optimal decision by an uninformed party and a biased decision by an informed party.
Is delegation worthwhile? Consider again an expert with bias b = 1 12 : The decision maker's payo¤ from the most informative partition equilibrium is 1 36 . Under delegation, the action chosen is y = + b and the payo¤ is b 2 = 1 144 . Thus delegation is preferred. Dessein (2001) shows that this is always true: Proposition 4 If the expert's bias is not too large, delegation is better than all equilibria of the CS model.
In fact, by exerting only slightly more control, the decision maker can do even better. As …rst pointed out by Holmström (1984) , the optimal delegation scheme involves limiting the scope of actions from which the expert can choose. Under the uniform-quadratic speci…cation, the decision maker should optimally limit the expert's choice of actions to y 2 [0; 1 b]: When b = 1 12 ; limiting actions in this way raises the decision maker's payo¤ from Optimal delegation still leads to information loss. When the expert's choice is "capped,"in high states the action is unresponsive to the state.
An application of the delegation principle arises in the US House of Representatives. Typically a specialized committee-analogous to an informed expert-sends a bill to the ‡oor of the House-the decision maker. How it may then be amended depends on the legislative rule under e¤ect. Under the so-called closed rule the ‡oor is limited in its ability to amend the bill while under the open rule the ‡oor may freely amend the bill. Thus operating under a closed rule is similar to delegation while an open rule is similar to the CS model. The proposition above suggests, and Krehbiel (1987, 1989 ) have shown, that, in some circumstances, the ‡oor may bene…t by adopting a closed rule.
Contracts
Up until now we have assumed that the decision maker did not compensate the expert for his advice. Can compensation, via an incentive contract, solve the information problem? To examine this, we amend the model to allow for compensation and use mechanism design to …nd the optimal contract. Suppose that the payo¤s are now given by
where t 0 is the amount of compensation.
Using the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to a direct mechanism where both t and y depend on the state reported by the expert. Notice that such mechanisms directly link the expert's reports to payo¤s-talk is no longer cheap.
Contracts are powerful instruments. A contract that leads to full information revelation and …rst-best actions is:
where^ is the state reported by the expert. Under this contract, the expert can do no better than to tell the truth, that is, to set^ = ; and, as a consequence, the action undertaken in this scheme is the "bliss"action for the decision maker. Full revelation is expensive however. When b = 1 12 ; the decision maker's payo¤ from this scheme is 1 12 : Notice that this is worse than the payo¤ of 1 36 in the best CS equilibrium, which can be obtained with no contract at all. The costs of implementing the fully revealing contract outweigh the bene…ts.
In general, Krishna and Morgan (2005) show:
Proposition 5 With contracts, full revelation is always feasible but never optimal. The proposition above shows that full revelation is never optimal. No contract at all is also not optimal-delegation is preferable. What is the structure of the optimal contract? A typical optimal contract is depicted as the dark line in Figure  2 . First, notice that even though the decision maker could induce his bliss action for some states, it is never optimal to do so. Instead, for low states ( < b) ; the decision maker implements a "compromise" action-an action that lies between and + b: When > b; the optimal contract simply consists of capped delegation.
Multiple senders
Thus far we have focused attention on how a decision maker should consult a single expert. In many instances, decision makers consult multiple experts-often with similar information but di¤ering ideologies (biases). Political leaders often form cabinets of advisors with overlapping expertise. How should a cabinet be constituted? Is a balanced cabinet-one with advisors with opposing ideologies-helpful? How should the decision maker structure the "debate"among her advisors?
To study these issues, we add a second expert having identical information to the CS model. To incorporate ideological di¤erences, suppose the experts have di¤ering biases. When both b 1 and b 2 are positive, the experts have like bias-both prefer higher actions compared to the decision maker. In contrast, if b 1 > 0 and b 2 < 0; then the experts have opposing bias-expert 1 prefers a higher action and expert 2 a lower action compared to the decision maker.
Simultaneous talk
When both experts report to the decision maker simultaneously, the information problem is apparently solved-full revelation is now an equilibrium. To see this, suppose the experts have like bias and consider the following strategy for the decision maker: choose the action that is the more "conservative"of the two recommendations. Precisely, if m 1 < m 2 ; choose action m 1 and vice-versa if m 2 < m 1 : Under this strategy, each expert can do no better than to report honestly if the other does likewise. If expert 2 reports m 2 = , then a report m 1 > ; has no e¤ect on the action. However, reporting m 1 < changes the action to y = m 1 , but this is worse for expert 1. Thus, expert 1 is content to simply tell the truth. Opposing bias requires a more complicated construction, but the e¤ect is the same-full revelation is an equilibrium (see Krishna and Morgan, 2001b) .
Notice that the above construction is fragile because truth-telling is a weakly dominated strategy. Each expert is at least as well o¤ by reporting m i = +b i and strictly better o¤ in some cases. Battaglini (2001) de…nes an equilibrium re…nement for such games which, like the notion of perfect equilibrium in …nite games, incorporates the usual idea that players may make mistakes. He then shows that such a re…nement rules out all equilibria with full revelation regardless of the direction of the biases. While the set of equilibria satisfying the re…nement is unknown, the fact that full revelation is ruled out means that simply adding a second expert does not solve the information problem satisfactorily.
Sequential talk
Finally, we turn to the case where the experts o¤er advice in sequence:
Both experts learn
Expert 1 sends message m 1 Expert 2 sends message m 2
Decision maker chooses y
Suppose that the two experts have biases b 1 = 1 18 and b 2 = 1 12 ; respectively. It is easy to verify (using (2) ) that if only expert 1 were consulted, then the most informative equilibrium entails his revealing that the state is either below 1 9 ; between 1 9 and 4 9 ; or above 4 9 : If only expert 2 were consulted, then the most informative equilibrium is where he reveals whether the state is below or above 1 3 : If the decision maker were able to consult only one of the two experts, she would be better o¤ consulting the more loyal expert 1.
But what happens if she consults both? It turns out that if both experts actively contribute information, then decision maker can do no better than the following equilibrium: Expert 1 speaks …rst and reveals whether or not the state is above or below 11 27 : If expert 1 reveals that the state is above 11 27 ; expert 2 reveals nothing further. If, however, expert 1 reveals that the state is below 11 27 , then expert 2 reveals further whether or not it is above or below 1 27 : That this is an equilibrium may be veri…ed again by using (2) and recognizing that, in state 1 27 ; expert 2 must be indi¤erent between the optimal action in the interval 0; 1 27 and the optimal action in 1 27 ; 11 27 : In state 11 27 , expert 1 must be indi¤erent between the optimal action in 1 27 ; 11 27 and the optimal action in 11 27 ; 1 : Sadly, by actively consulting both experts, the decision maker is worse o¤ than if she simply ignored expert 2 and consulted only her more loyal advisor, expert 1. This result is quite general, as shown by Krishna and Morgan (2001a) :
Proposition 6 When experts have like biases, actively consulting the less loyal expert never helps the decision maker.
The situation is quite di¤erent when experts have opposing biases; that is, when the cabinet is balanced. To see this, suppose that the cabinet is comprised of two equally loyal experts biases b 1 = 1 12 and b 2 = 1 12 . Consulting expert 1 alone leads to a partition 0; 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 while consulting expert 2 alone leads to the partition 0; 2 3 ; 2 3 ; 1 : If instead, the decision maker asked both experts for advice, the following is an equilibrium: expert 1 reveals whether is above or below 2 9 : If he reveals that the state is below 2 9 ; the discussion ends. If, however, expert 1 indicates that the state is above 2 9 ; expert 2 is actively consulted and reveals further whether the state is above or below 7 9 : Based on this, the decision maker takes the appropriate action. One may readily verify that this is an improvement over consulting either expert alone. Once again the example readily generalizes:
Proposition 7 When experts have opposing biases, actively consulting the both experts always helps the decision maker.
Indeed, the decision maker can be more clever than this. One can show that with experts of opposing bias, there exist equilibria where a portion of the state space is fully revealed. By allowing for a "rebuttal" stage in the debate, there exists an equilibrium where all information is fully revealed.
